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INTRODUCTION
As third-party funding of litigation begins to take hold in
the United States, debates about the normative value of such
arrangements have heated up among scholars, practitioners,
and policymakers. Meanwhile, such arrangements are up and
running-providing capital for parties in various cases. As a
result, while higher-level debates remain ongoing, courts have
had to grapple with on-the-ground issues at the intersection of
* Copyright © 2016 byJ. Maria Glover. J. Maria Glover is an Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
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such funding arrangements and the operation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, as this essay addresses,
courts have begun to deal with the question of whether and to
what extent materials created in the course of obtaining and
making use of third-party funding in litigation qualify for
work-product protection under Rule 26.
The work-product doctrine, codified in Rule 26 after years
of existence in the common law, has long been understood as
protecting the values and functions of the adversarial system.
To that end, it limits the otherwise open and liberal system of
discovery under the Federal Rules by shielding from produc-
tion materials created "in anticipation of litigation," on the
grounds that attorneys should be afforded a "zone of privacy"
in which to prepare their cases, and that adversaries should
not be able to intrude upon that zone of privacy in order to
free-load off the efforts of their opponents. The work-product
doctrine has traditionally and most frequently been invoked to
protect materials created by attorneys in the course of ready-
ing a case for trial, as such materials frequently contain mental
impressions, opinions, and thoughts of the attorney that would
provide a direct window into her litigation strategy, thereby
frustrating adversarial norms.
As litigation techniques have evolved, the work-product
doctrine has been invoked to protect what might be consid-
ered less traditional materials that courts have nonetheless
found to have been prepared "because of' or "in anticipation
of' litigation, such as materials prepared to evaluate the tax
implications of a potential merger,1 materials generated in the
1. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
work-product protection applied to a memorandum prepared by an ac
countant and an attorney detailing the potential tax liability implications
and litigation risks associated with a possible merger between the client and
Sequa Corporation, characterizing the memorandum as constituting an at-
torney's evaluation of her case). In AdIman, the Second Circuit indicated
that work product protection might be appropriate in other less traditional
contexts. It set forth two hypotheticals in which it believed such protection
would be appropriate. One, if a bank, in the course of a lending decision,
required a client seeking the loan to provide an assessment of its ongoing
litigation and likelihood of success in that litigation. Two, if a securities un-
derwriter requested an assessment of a company's ongoing litigation and
likelihood of success therein before the underwriter decided to go forward
with a public offering. See id. at 1199-2000.
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course of an employer's preparation for large-scale layoffs, 2
and materials generated by independent accountants in the
course of an audit,3just to name a few. In just the last few years
or so, courts have been faced with the question of whether
materials created in relation to alternative litigation funding
arrangements fit within the work-product protection. Because
alternative litigation finance is in its infancy in the United
States, the number of opinions dealing with the issue are rela-
tively few. As this essay traces, however, the general trend so far
has been in favor of extending work-product protection to liti-
gation funding materials.
Indeed, the courts' inclination toward protecting litiga-
tion funding materials has been quite broad-sweeping, and
often the cases do not square easily with the often rigorously-,
fact- and document-intensive work-product doctrine analysis.
As this essay explains, the emerging trend toward near categor-
ical protection for funding materials is perhaps at best only
partially explained by the work-product doctrine itself. In-
stead, this trend seems undergirded less by considerations re-
lated to the work-product doctrine or its normative underpin-
nings, and more by those related to the goals and functions of
2. See Maloney v. Sisters of Charity Hosp. of Buffalo, N.Y., 165 F.R.D. 26,
30 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that the niateijals generated in preparation for
large-scale layoffs by the Human Resource Director were done so at the di-
rection of counsel, who reasonably anticipated future litigation arising out of
the layoffs).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(holding that a memorandum prepared by independent auditors memorial-
izing a communication with their client and its attorneys about potential tax
li-Ahility in -4ssociatinn with the -udit might, upop remand review by the dis-
trict court judge, qualify for work-product protection). Courts in other cir-
cuits, however, have reached the opposite conclusion about taro documents
when prepared not just with an eye toward litigation, but also for an inde-
pendent purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577
F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) (explaining that tax documents pre-
pared for independent reason of fulfilling stattutory obigition were not sui-
ject to work-product protection even though they related to the subject mat-
ter of the litigation); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542-44 (5th
Cir. 1982) (holding that tax pool analysis prepared by attorneys for El Paso
did not constitute work-product because, though they discussed theories
about possible results in litigation, among other things, no litigation had
commenced and no specific litigation was referenced and concluding that
these documents had, instead, been created in the ordinary course of busi-
ness).
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litigation funding itself. Specifically, these opinions appear to
reflect concerns that withholding protection of these docu-
ments would impede both the funded party's ability to pursue
her claim on the merits and the ability of litigation funding to
achieve its purpose of bringing about a greater equality of re-
sources among parties.
This essay proceeds in two parts. Part I is descriptive, and
provides both a brief history of the work-product doctrine and
an account of the current state of the law regarding the appli-
cation of the work-product doctrine to litigation funding
materials. Because alternative litigation finance is still in its
early stages in the United States, the case law exploring the
intersection between litigation funding and the work-product
doctrine is evolving. Nonetheless, a general trend toward pro-
tection of funding materials has undoubtedly emerged. As
Part II explains, this trend appears to be motivated by con-
cerns that are both beyond and ulielated to the work-pioduct
doctrine-namely, concerns about protecting the availability,
functioning, and normative goals of litigation funding itself.
Part II then begins to explore possible implications of this
trend, arguing that recognition of the normative considera-
tions beyond the scope of the work-product doctrine underly-
ing these opinions may well shed light on other, less litigated
issues that also test the boundaries of the work-product doc-
trine in the context of alternative litigation finance.
I.
STATE OF THE LAW: THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO LITIGATION FUNDING MATERIALS
As third-party litigation funding has gained a foothold in
the United States, courts have begun to grapple with questions
regarding the discoverability of materials created as part of
those funding arrangements. Because these materials do not
typically reflect communications between an attorney and cli-
ent, arguments claiming the attorney-client privilege have
proven largely unsuccessful. Instead, funded parties have
turned increasingly to arguments that these funding materials
are protected by the work-product doctrine.
This section proceeds in two parts. The first part provides
a brief history of the work-product doctrine itself. This short
overview is not intended to replace more robust and thorough
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accounts. 4 Rather, it is intended to provide background
against which both the applicability and limitations of work-
product protection to alternative litigation financing materials
should be understood. The second part provides an overview
of the state of the law at the intersection of the work-product
doctrine and litigation funding.
A. Brief History of the Work-Product Doctrine
The seeds of what would become the work-product doc-
trine began as a reaction to the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1938, 5 which broadened the scope of dis-
covery significantly from prior practice 6 but provided no ex-
plicit protection for materials that could be described as attor-
ney work-product. In the years following the enactment of the,
Federal Rules in 1938, courts were faced with disputes regard-
ing requests for documents prepared for trial split-some al-
lowed production, and some held that such materials were
protected. 7 On the one hand, those courts that withheld pro-
tection cited "liberal spirit of discovery" as being inconsistent
with work-product protection. 8 On the other hand, many
4. See, e.g., Jeff A. Anderson et al., The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL
L. Riv. 760, 765 (1983); Arthur B. LaFrance, Work-Product Discovery: A Cri-
tique, 68 DICK. L. REv. 351, 353-56 (1963-64) (providing a detailed discus-
sion of the pre-1938 Rules' discovery procedures); Charles R. Taine, Discovery
of Trial Preparations in theFederal Courts, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 1026, 1026 (1950).
5. See Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 765 (1983).
6. See LaFrance, supra note 4, at 353-56; Taine, supra note 4, at 1026.
7. See Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (noting that
there was a "sharp conflict of decisions" between courts asked to rule on
requests for documents prepared for trial and citing cases on either side of
the split).
8. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 769. For a collection of cases that
allowed discovery of materials prepared for trial, see id. at 769 nn.58-61. See
also Taine, supra note 4, at 1029 nn.19-20. As one prominent example, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Bough
v. Lce, a personal injury suit stemming from a car accident, the court allowed
plaintiffs to obtain from the defendant insurance company pictures of the
car it had taken and statements it had taken from both the plaintiff and its
co-defendant, on the grounds that the materials were relevant and material
to the claims; there was no confidential relationship between the investiga-
tors and the persons who provided the statements, and there was no bad
faith, oppression, or unreasonableness. Bough v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673
(S.D.N.Y. 1939). Other courts reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Kane v.
News Syndicate Co., 1 F.R.D. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Leach v. Greif Bros. Coop-
erage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444, 445 (S.D. Miss. 1942) (rejecting defendant's claim
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lower courts prohibited parties from obtaining through discov-
ery materials that could be classified as "attorney work-prod-
uct."9
Some of the courts that protected work-product materials
did so on grounds distinct from those underlying the modern
work-product doctrine-for instance, some courts held that at-
torney work-product was not "material";10 other courts pro-
tected such material unless the requesting party could demon-
strate that it was admissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence." Some courts, though, disallowed requesting parties
from obtaining materials that constituted "attorney work-prod-
uct" for reasons sounding quite similar to those that undergird
the modem work-product doctrine. For example, in a fre-
quently cited 1939 case, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York in McCarthy v. Palmer ex-
plained its rationale for denying discovery of material that con-
stituted work-product as follows:
While the Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to
permit liberal examination and discovery, they were
not intended to be made the vehicle through which
one litigant could make use of his opponent's prepa-
ration of his case. To use them in such a manner
would penalize the diligent and place a premium on
laziness. It is fair to assume that, except in the most
unusual circumstances, no such result was in-
tended.12
of attorney client privilege, the court granted plaintiffs request to discover
from defendant employer two documents containing statements taken from
plaintiff and an eyewitness regarding plaintiffs work-related injury. The
statements had been taken by an individual to whom plaintiff had granted
power of attorney to communicate with defendant's district manager in an
ultimately unsuccessful effort to settle the matter. The court granted plain-
tiff's discovery requests on the grounds that the discovery rules should be
"liberally construed" to prevent surprise); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Pro-
cess Co., 1 F.R.D. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1940) (permitting defendant to obtain
records of communications between plaintiffs' counsel and other attorneys
in a prior related suit).
9. See Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 770 nn.63, 66.
10. See Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 768, 771.
11. See id.
12. McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). Other
courts reached similar results. Byers Theaters v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D.
Va. 1940) ("[O]ne party should not be allowed to require another to make
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Indeed, in the years following the enactment of the Fed-
eral Rules in 1938, a number of scholars, judges, and attorneys
began to think that, under this liberal discovery regime, some
manner of protection for attorney work-product was needed.' 3
In 1944, the Rules Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure entered the fray and issued a proposal to
amend Rule 30(b), under which courts could issue protective
orders "designat[ing] [that] restrictions be imposed upon in-
quiry into papers and documents prepared or obtained by the
adverse party in the preparation of case for trial. '1 4 The pur-
poses of the proposed amendment were one, to empower
courts to limit discovery of work-product, but not to ban the
acquisition of it altogether, 15 and two, to exclude from discov-
ery "matters which, if obtained, are of no great value to the
investigation, research, or compilation of data or statistics for him which he
might equally as well make for himself."); see also Maryland v. Pan-Am. Bus
Lines, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 213, 215 (D. Md. 1940) (denying party's discovery re-
quest for statements taken by the defendant's insurer of witnesses to the
accident at issue on the grounds that allowing discovery would give the re-
questing party free access to the other party's work); Stark v. Am. Dredging
Co., 3 F.R.D. 300, 301-02 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (denying a request by plaintiff,
executor of the deceased estate, that defendant produce records of state-
ments made by defendant's employees to the defendant's insurance carrier
in relation to the insurance company's investigation of the decedent's death
on the job site). See also LaFrance, supra note 4, at 360 (cataloging cases).
13. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 766. Support for work-product pro-
tection was expressed by scholars. See Taine, supra note 4, at 1028 n.16 (ex-
plaining that support for work-product protection based on fairness con-
cerns "even permeated the thinking of certain legal writers") (citing John F.
Caskey & Charles F. Young, Some Limitations upon Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 28 VA. L. REv. 348, 355 (1942)). Support was likewise ex-
pressed by judges. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Palmer, 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1940)
(protecting work-product from discovery); Stark, 3 F.R.D. 300; Pan-Am. Bus
Lines, 1 F.R.D. 213. In addition, lawyers also supported work-product protec-
tion. See Leland L. Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Doc-
uments and the Work-product of the Lawyer, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 498, 504 (1958)
(The question of work-product protection "aroused ... much decision on
the bench, at the bar, and in academic halls").
14. Tolman, supra note 13, at 504 (quoting the Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
(1944)).
15. Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 44 (1944).
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party making the inquiry if the material is legitimately used."1 6
The final proposed amendment was issued in 1946, wherein
the standards of unfair prejudice and undue hardship were
introduced, as was complete protection for attorneys' mental
impressions.17 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court chose not to
forward the proposed Rule amendment to Congress, as it had
just granted certiorari in Hickman v. Taylor.1 8
As is well known, in Hickman,19 the Supreme Court en-
shrined into law what is now known as the work-product doc-
trine. Hickman involved a tugboat accident in which five crew
members were killed. 20 The tugboat operator hired an attor-
ney immediately after the accident, and that attorney inter-
viewed four survivors.21 Those interviews were memorialized in
signed, written statements and notes by the attorney about the
interviews. The family of one of the deceased crew members
sued Taylor & Anderson Towing & Lighterage Co., which
owned the tugboat. During discovery, the family sought the
statements that the attorney had obtained from the survivors. 22
The district court held the documents were not protected. 23
The Third Circuit reversed, extending the attorney-client privi-
lege beyond the parameters of "attorney" and "client" to cover
the documents. 24 The Supreme Court rejected the Third
Circuit's distortion of the attorney-client privilege, but never-
theless held the documents were protected as "work-prod-
uct."25 Such materials fell outside of the parameters of even
liberal discovery, the Court stated, because, at least in the ab-
sence of any showing ofjustification and need, requiring pro-
duction of work-product would "contravene[] the public pol-
icy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal
claims. 26
16. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Second Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Dis-
trict Courts of the United States, 39-40 (1945).
17. Tolman, supra note 13, at 506.
18. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 498.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 498-99.
23. Id. at 499.
24. Id. at 500.
25. Id. at 508, 512.
26. Id. at 510.
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Indeed, the need for a work-product doctrine, the Court
reasoned, was that protection of work-product from discovery
would safeguard the adversarial process by providing a "zone
of privacy" within which attorneys could develop their cases. 27
On the one hand, by allowing for this zone of privacy, the
work-product doctrine maintains an attorney's incentive to de-
velop and advance with vigor the facts and legal theories of the
case. Conversely, without this "zone of privacy," attorneys will
be disincentivized to memorialize their impressions and obser-
vations28 and to prepare in advance 29 because of the knowl-
edge that what they do could be turned over to their oppo-
nents. 30 In that sense, the work-product doctrine seeks to in-
centivize and enable attorneys to act in their core function in
the adversarial process; 3 1 developing the facts and legal theo-
27. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 784-85 ("The central justification for
the work-pioduct doctrite is that it pIccrVcs L tIL plirvaty uf picpa Ilo,,l tlhdt
is essential to the attorney's adversary role.").
28. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 786 ("It has been suggested that
attorneys, hoping to avoid discovery, will not record reports and information
which would otherwise be recorded, thereby making trial preparation less
efficient."); Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REv.
1515, 1526 (1991) ("Work-product immunity, its supporters believe . . . al-
lows the advocate to commit the results of that investigation and other litiga-
tion-related thought processes to writing ... [and] avoids forcing litigants to
freeze their contentions too early in a lawsuit.").
29. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 786 ("To maximize the facts available
in a case, an attorney must be committed to developing those facts. An attor-
ney who hopes to take advantage of his opponent's diligence will lack this
commitment. Absence of a work product doctrine would encourage laziness
and a 'wait and see' attitude.").
30. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 ("Were such materials open to opposing
counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
reinai,- unirittcc. Aii attornecy's thoughts, licrctofoi c inviolate, would not be
his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably de-
velop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial.");
In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 334 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The primary purpose of
the work product privilege is to assure that an attorney is not inhibited in his
representation of his client by the fear that his files will be open to scrutiny
upon demand of an opposing party."); D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney
Worh Product Doctrine and Cany Over Immunity: An Assessment of ThtirJustifica-
tions, 47 U. PIrr. L. REv. 675, 682 (1986) ("[W]ithout the work product im-
munity, the 'cost' of the lawyer's case preparation increases since an adver-
sary may ultimately benefit from the lawyer's work product. For this reason,
lawyers would do less in the performance of their professional duties.").
31. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 785 ("The zone of privacy, which
allows unfettered investigation, thus permits a greater degree of freedom to
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ries of a case fulfills any attorney's duty to their clients and to
the courts.32 At the heart of the work-product doctrine, then,
is a concern for the adversarial system itself.
The work-product doctrine as articulated in Hickman in
1946 was not included in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
until decades later. In 1970, the work-product doctrine was
codified (and clarified) in Rule 26.33 Under Rule 26, the work-
product doctrine protects "documents and tangible things"
that are "prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial."34 To
satisfy the "litigation or trial" requirement, litigation need not
develop facts and theories."); Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation
Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CALIF. L. Rrv. 313, 411 (1991) ("[T]he central
thrust of the doctrine is to lower the risks associated with recording, manipu-
lating, and analyzing information[.]"); Wells, supra note 30, at 681 ("The
broad rationale for the work product doctrine is that lawyers will better serve
their clients and the ends of justice when the) can operate in a 'zone of
privacy.'"). Cf Bundy & Elhauge, supra, at 412 (theorizing that work-product
protection will be weaker where it does not "increase the flow of information
to the tribunal").
32. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 ("Proper preparation of a client's case de-
mands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the rele
rant from the irrelevant facts prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference That i the historical and the nec-
esary way in which lawyers act within the frameworl of our system ofjuris
prudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests.");
Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 784 ("By placing the burden of representa-
tion on the parties themselves, the adversary system fosters a competitive
relationship that motivates each part), to marshal all the law and facts benefi
cial to its case.").
33. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 Advisory Committee's note to 1970 amendment.
The Rules Advisory Committee issued the amendment to clear up confusion
about the work product doctrine's scope post Hichman. For example, there
was significant debate over whether the work-product doctrine covered
materials created by non attorneys. Id; Attoneys:" Attorney Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine Held Inapplicable to Prevent Disclosure of Expert Appraisal
Report Prepared for Estate Tax Return, 1967 DuE L.J. 691, 692 (1967) (discuss-
ing dissention in the courts and commentary over the use of work product
doctrine to cover reports made by experts);James L. Steimel, Comments: Work
Product in the Federal Discovery Procedure, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 329, 330 (1960)
(discussiig Conflict in th. t-oui ts uvti vhtl itCL sIataLicits takei, by noU-lav-
yers for use by lawye are nvereri) Adinnally, there was conf!)sno ant
debate over the meaning of Hichman's good cause requirement. FED. R. CIv.
P. 26. Advisory Committee's note to 1970 amendment.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (A).
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be in progress, but it must be at least somewhat foreseeable. 35
However, as to the "prepared in anticipation of litigation" re-
quirement, courts remain split even today in their approaches.
A minority of courts require the party invoking the privilege to
demonstrate that litigation was the "primary reason" that the
requested materials were created. 36 A majority of federal
courts apply a "because of' test; in other words, those courts
ask whether a document or tangible thing was prepared "be-
cause of' the prospect of litigation,37 leaving more room for
the privilege to apply. Even under the more liberal "because
of' test, however, some courts have denied protection to docu-
ments that were prepared in the "ordinary course of business,"
even if future litigation was possible. 38 Moreover, even if the
work-product privilege is found to apply in any given case, the
35. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,
865 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1985) ("If the primary motivating purpose behind the crea-
tion of the document is not to assist in pending or impending litigation,
then a finding that the document enjoys work-product immunity is not man-
dated.").
37. See, e.g., UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 735 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (quoting the test in the Wright & Miller treatise as "whether, in light
... of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the
document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained 'because of'
the prospect of litigation," and noting that "most other courts have held...
that the 'because of' test ... is the proper way to determine whether a docu-
ment was prepared 'in anticipation of litigation' and thus is eligible for pro-
tection under Rule 26(b)(3).").
38. See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622
(7th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing between documents created in the ordinary
course of business for a relatively unlikely possibility of future litigation and
documents prepared once a claim had been filed and providing protection
only for the latter); Sullivan v. Warminster Twp., 274 F.R.D. 147, 152 (E.D.
Pa. 2011) (holding that "documents prepared in the regular course of busi-
ness rather than for purposes of the litigation are not eligible for work-prod-
uct protection, even if the prospect of litigation exist[ed]" when the materi-
als were created); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir.
1998) ("[T] he 'because of' formulation that we adopt here withholds protec-
tion from documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or
that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the
litigation."); Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work Prod-
uct Doctrine, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1083, 1103 (2012) (noting that many
courts refuse to extend work-product protection to materials created in the
ordinary course of business).
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privilege can be waived, 39 or, in the case of ordinary work-
product,40 it may yield in the face of a showing of substantial
need by the requesting party.41
Throughout its history-pre-Hickman, pre-Rule 26, and
post-Rule 26-the work-product doctrine has been invoked al-
most exclusively to protect the work created by attorneys pre-
paring for (at least the theoretical prospect of) 4 2 trial. This is,
of course, directly in line with the normative goals that under-
lie the protection. However, as litigation techniques have con-
tinued to evolve, new questions have arisen as to which docu-
ments prepared by which people are covered under the work-
product privilege. Indeed, courts have for many years been
grappling with the application of work-product protection in
what one might call non-traditional contexts. 43 The next part
discusses a very recent of these non-traditional contexts in
which courts have had to deal with questions of work-product
protection: materials created in the course of obtaining and
making use of alternative litigation finance arrangements.
B. The Work-Product Doctrine Meets Alternative
Litigation Finance
One new, yet increasingly common, litigation develop-
ment that has intersected frequently with the work-product
doctrine in recent years is the growth of third-party litigation
funding. In these funding arrangements, a third party ad-
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (5) (B).
40. Ordinary work-product does not include attorney thoughts, mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories regarding the litiga-
tion, which are considered core work-product. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b) (3) (B).
41. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3) (A) (ii). Courts are not uniform in their ap-
proaches to the "substantial need" test. Some courts view Rule
26(b) (3) (A) (ii) as creating a two-prong test. See, e.g., Fisher v. Nat'l R.R. Pas-
senger Corp., 152 F.R.D. 145, 153 n.10 (S.D. Ind. 1993). Others apply a
three-factor balancing test. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & RICHARD L. MAR-
CUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2025 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the
test as involving "three foci").
42. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319
(1991) (providing an outlier theory of "anomalous" cases that get to trial
rather than settlement); J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012) (discussing the decline of trial and rise of
settlement).
43. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199-2000; Maloney, 165 F.R.D. 26.
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vances money to a party (typically, the plaintiff) to enable her
to proceed with her case, and the funder then takes a cut of
the winnings. 44 This type of funding mechanism is especially
appealing to plaintiffs who do not have the resources to en-
gage in major litigation with extensive recovery, and who, with-
out an additional source of funding, may ultimately have to
drop their claims or accept unfair settlements. 45 As plaintiffs
are increasingly entering into litigation finance agreements
with third-party funders, questions have arisen as to the discov-
erability of the terms of these contracts as well as the commu-
nications between a party's lawyer and the funder during and
after negotiations of such a contract.46
Because the growth of third party litigation funding is a
relatively new phenomenon, the legal landscape regarding
these questions is evolving. I therefore provide generalizations
about the doctrinal trends these cases reveal with a requisite
level of caution regarding their predictive value for future
cases. Nonetheless, these cases do, so far, reveal some clear
general trends. Overall, courts have been quite receptive of ar-
guments that materials regarding litigation finance arrange-
ments constitute work-product. Moreover, with few exceptions,
courts have largely held that the funded party does not waive
work-product protection of those materials by sharing infor-
mation with the third-party litigation funder.
As a preliminary matter, in order to even reach the work-
product question, the requesting party must demonstrate that
the materials relating to the terms of litigation financing
agreements satisfy the Rule 26 requirement of relevance. 47
That is, the information must be "reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. '48 Funding documents
often-though not always49-have the potential to be relevant
44. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 718 (N.D. Ill.
2014).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 721; FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense.").
48. Mier, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 722 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Kaplan v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., No. 12-CV-9350 (VM)(KNF),
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135031 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015).
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to claims or defenses. 50 At the same time, the terms of an ulti-
mate funding agreement and the communications between
the party and the funder almost always will reveal some analy-
sis conducted by the funded party or its attorney regarding the
merits of the case-information that falls within the scope of
Rule 26(b) (3) (B) and is thus protected by the work-product
privilege.5 '
Thus far, courts have generally held that materials con-
taining communications between attorneys and third-party
funders are protected by the work-product privilege, as they
have been prepared "because of' the prospect of litigation,
even though they are also prepared for a business purpose 52
(entering into a business contract for funding) and therefore
potentially not characterized as prepared "primarily or exclu-
sively to assist in litigation. '53 Even courts that characterize the
funding arrangements as constituting a business transaction
have held that they are still covered by the work-product privi-
50. See, e.g., Doe v. Soc'y of Missionaries of Sacred Heart, No. 11-CV-
02518, 2014 WL 1715376, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2014) (financing materials
were relevant because "they could potentially shed light on the statute of
limitations defense asserted by [defendant]"); Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d (re-
questing party claimed that various deal documents were relevant to claims
of champerty and maintenance); Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899,
2012 WL 4748160 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012).
51. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A, No. CV 7841-VCP,
2015 WL 778846, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2015) ("[T]he terms of the final
agreement-such as the financing premium or acceptable settlement condi-
tions-could reflect an analysis of the merits of the case.").
52. Carlyle, 2015 WL 778846, at *8. See Doe, 2014 WL 1715376, at *4 (hold-
ing that an email from a public relations firm that was forwarded from plain-
tiffs counsel to a litigation financing company was not protected under the
work-product privilege because the communications "deal only with the pub-
lic relations firm's strategy to 'generate media coverage,"' rather than with
litigation strategy).
53. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) ("We
believe that a requirement that documents be produced primarily or exclu-
sively to assist in litigation in order to be protected is at odds with the text
and policies of the Rule. Nowhere does Rule 26(b)(3) state that a document
must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to con-
stitute work product, much less primarily or exclusively to aid in litigation.");
Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1119 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[T]he test should be whether, in light of the nature of the docu-
ment and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly
be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litiga-
tion."); Carlyle, 2015 WL 778846, at *8 (applying Delaware law).
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lege because they would not be prepared but for an impending
litigation.54 Those courts have reasoned that, in order to ob-
tain the funding, the lawyer will likely have to provide mental
impressions, theories, and strategies about the merits of the
case to convince the third party to supply financing.55 At least
one court also has held that the work-product protection ap-
plies even when the requested documents are not prepared in
connection with any ongoing litigation, reasoning that those
materials are prepared in order to aid in future possible litiga-
tion.56
Moreover, the majority of courts thus far have held that a
claim of work-product privilege in this context is not waived
because the party claiming that privilege has shared informa-
tion about the case with the third-party funder. Under the
work-product doctrine, waiver of work-product privilege "oc-
curs when the protected communications are disclosed in a
manner that substantially increased the opportunity for poten-
tial adversaries to obtain the information. '57 Even though the
potential funders or investors will generally be considered
third parties for purposes of this inquiry, courts have tended to
find that disclosure of this information does not waive work-
product protection, especially when the documents are subject
to non-disclosure agreements. 58 The existence of non-disclo-
sure agreements "militates against a finding of waiver," as well
as the fact that the litigation financing companies have an in-
centive to protect the information from disclosure to the op-
posing party, because if they disclosed information it would
harm their ability to attract clients in the future. 59 Therefore,
54. Carlyle, 2015 WL 778846, at *9.
55. Id.
56. Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011
WL 1714304, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011) ("Although the [funding] docu-
ments may not have been prepared in connection with ongoing litigation,
the documents were at a minimum created for possible future litigation.").
At least one author has noted that evaluative materials prepared in the audit
setting are prepared because of the threat of litigation, and are therefore
protected by work product privilege. Giesel, supra note 38, at 1118.
57. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 736 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Mondis, 2011 WL
1714304, at *2.
58. Mondis, 2011 WL 1714304, at *3.
59. Doe v. Soc'y of Missionaries of Sacred Heart, No. 11-CV-02518, 2014
WL 1715376, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2014).
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disclosure of information to litigation financing companies
generally does not "substantially increase the opportunity for
potential adversaries to obtain the information." 60 However, at
least one court has found that communications between a
party and a third-party funder are not privileged before any
funding agreement is actually consummated, so any docu-
ments disclosed to a third-party funder before a funding agree-
ment is reached will not be protected. 61 At least at this point,
drawing an ex ante distinction seems to be a minority posi-
tion.62
II.
ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE AND THE LIMITS OF THE
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
To be sure, the state of the law on work-product protec-
tion of materials created in the course of securing and using
litigation funding is in flux. There are relatively few decided
cases, and the reasoning in some of the cases is sparse. Accord-
ingly, drawing any broad conclusions about either the trajec-
tory of the doctrine or about the broader implications for liti-
gation funding risk being premature.
60. This view is also supported by some of the secondary literature on
this topic. See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 38, at 1111-12 ("The common-interest
concept in work productjurisprudence should simply be a shortcut to deter
mining whether the disclosure 'substantially increased the opportunity for
potential adversaries to obtain information,' or was 'not inconsistent with
maintaining secrecy against opponents,' or whether 'the disclosing party had
a reasonable basis for believing that the recipient' of the materials 'would
keep the disclosed material confidential."') (internal citations omitted).
61. Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D.
Del. 2010) (combining analysis of attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine principles and rejecting plaintiff's argument that the district court
erred in finding that no common interest existed between plaintiff and the
litigation funder prior to the deal being consummated).
62. See, e.g., Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (not drawing such a distinction); Charge Injection
Techs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Numours & Co., No. 07C-12-134, 2015 WL
1540520 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2015) (extending protection to materials
created during the negotiation of litigation funding). Given the language of
the common interest doctrine, however, one can see the basis for distin
guishing between materials created after a litigation funding agreement is
entered into, and materials generated prior to entering into such an agree-
ment.
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Nonetheless, as the first part of this section explains, the
courts' relatively broad-sweeping inclination toward protecting
litigation funding materials seems to reveal broader considera-
tions than those raised by the work-product doctrine-consid-
erations, instead, about the goals and functioning of litigation
funding itself. In particular, what seems to explain the trend
toward categorical protection from production for funding
materials is not so much the strict dictates of the work-product
doctrine or discovery rules, but rather concerns that withhold-
ing protection of these documents would impede both the
funded party's ability to pursue her claim on the merits and
the ability of litigation funding to achieve its purpose of bring-
ing about a greater equality of resources among parties.
Moreover, recognizing the protective policy toward litiga-
tion funding that seems to underlie these courts' decisions
sheds light on other, less frequently litigated issues that test
the boundaries of the work-product doctrine as applied to al-
ternative litigation finance. As the second part of this section
explores, by way of example, even the act of claiming work-
product protection by way of a privilege log-a fundamental,
core practice under the work-product doctrine-not only cre-
ates unique burdens for the funded party that frustrate the un-
derlying purpose of the litigation funding in the first place but
also may well reveal information the work-product doctrine
was actually designed to protect. Going forward, then, it would
be consistent with existing trends for courts faced with these
issues in the future to look beyond the narrower confines of
the work-product doctrine to analyze the scope of discovery of
litigation funding materials.
A. Beyond the Work-Product Doctrine: The Normative Value
Judgments Underlying the Opinions Protecting Funding
Materials from Discovery
As discussed above, decisions regarding alternative litiga-
tion finance and the work-product doctrine tend to come out
in favor of more or less categorical protection for documents
exchanged in connection with negotiation of the funding deal
and subsequent communications between the funder and the
party (or the party's attorney). This outcome, however, argua-
bly is difficult to square with the typically fact- and document-
intensive considerations courts give to work-product issues. It
seems, then, that these decisions reflect two sometimes
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stated-but often unstated-considerations, largely unrelated
to the work-product doctrine. First, requests for these kinds of
communications can be understood as mechanisms by which
defendants seek to impede efforts by the plaintiffs to vindicate
their claims on the merits. Apart from the rare instance in
which a defendant has a legitimate defense under state law
champerty or maintenance doctrines,63 the only arguable rele-
vance of these materials is that they reflect either the litigation
funder's or the party's assessment of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the plaintiffs' claim or damage estimate. This may
satisfy relevance in a technical sense, because those documents
could well reveal information that bears on a claim or defense,
but it is clearly not the kind of information that should be usa-
ble at trial or otherwise. 64 The defendant's request for these
documents thus tends to come unsupported by any weighty
argument as to why the information would be useful for the
court's resolution of the claims on the merits.
Second, these courts tend to recognize that allowing dis-
covery into these matters will tend by itself to undermine the
point of litigation finance, a concern that the work-product
doctrine does not address. These decisions thus arguably re-
flect a recognition that permitting discovery into these matters
effectively constitutes a tax on the plaintiffs' use of litigation
funding. They recognize that permitting discovery of these
materials may in fact so sap the plaintiffs' resources that the
defendant may achieve indirectly what the litigation funding
arrangement was meant to solve in the first place, by under-
mining the level playing field that litigation finance was meant
to provide.
63. See, e.g., Del Webb Cmtys. Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th
Cir. 2011) ("The consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not
expanding, champerty's reach.").
64. For instance, a funder's assessment of the plaintiff's likely recovery
should not be used to influence the fact-finder's resolution of the claim's
merits, any more than an adversary should be able to call its adversary's at-
torneys to testify about the legal weaknesses of their client's case. See, e.g.,
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 741 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
("What [Mattenson] should not be allowed to do is cross-examine lawyer
Bradley about the company's legal vulnerabilities.") (citing Mattenson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006)); Mister v. Ne. Ill.
Commuter R.R. Corp., 571 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2009) (party admission can be
excluded under Rule 403).
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Take, for instance, the decision of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania-apply-
ing the law of a state where doctrines of champerty and main-
tenance have been explicitly declared alive and wel165-in
Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corporation. There, the court granted
plaintiff's motion for a protective order to quash subpoenas
directed at Burford Group LLC, Glenavy Capital LLC, and Lit-
igation Risk Solutions LLC, which were asked to evaluate
plaintiff's case to determine the feasibility of providing financ-
ing to the plaintiff.66 The subpoenas directed to those funders
requested production of an assortment of documents relating
to the financial evaluation process generally, and more specifi-
cally, production of materials relating to the funders' financial
condition, their communications with the funded party, the
lawsuit the third-party funders were asked to (and did ulti-
mately) finance, and the funders' relationship with the plain-
tiff.67 The court, in a one-page opinion (contained, strangely,
entirely in a footnote), concluded that the requested materials
were protected by the work-product doctrine and the attor-
ney-client privilege, under a theory of common legal inter-
est.6
8
Such a swift and largely unexplained holding is both in-
teresting, and potentially revealing, about the larger consider-
ations at work. For one thing, the purpose for which these
materials were sought was to aid defendant in its pursuit of a
defense of champerty and maintenance-in one of the minor-
ity of states where those defenses are still enforced. 69 It is hard
to imagine a set of materials more relevant to such claims and
defenses than the very documents that might demonstrate that
the plaintiffs had, in fact, violated those prohibitions. More
than that, the work-product privilege is not absolute-it can
yield, for instance, upon a showing of substantial need.7 0
Among the considerations for a showing of substantial need is
an evaluation of whether the requested materials are available
65. Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
66. Devon, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d at 441.
70. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3) (A) (ii).
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elsewhere. 71 Here, too, the court's holding seems strange: it is
hard to imagine what other materials would be relevant to their
claims and defenses of champerty and maintenance besides
those concerning the negotiation, obtaining, and use of third-
party funding for the litigation.
In short, neither the relevance standard of 26(b) (1) nor
the work-product doctrine alone explain the opinion in Devon.
To be sure, the court was correct that granting defendants'
discovery request might well reveal sensitive information
about, say, the funders' view of the merits of plaintiffs' case,
the plaintiffs' financial status-information that falls within
the protection of the work-product doctrine. However, given
the state of the law regarding champerty and maintenance in
Pennsylvania, one cannot accuse the defendants of lacking any
meaningful support for their requests for the funding materi-
als, nor, it seems, can one so easily resolve the tension between
protecting the funding materials on the one hand and provid-
ing defendants with what are likely some of the only materials
about their defense that exist-a tension the court in Devon
did not acknowledge. At a minimum, then, I believe the
court's decision implicitly recognizes that granting the defend-
ants' request would not so much undermine the work-product
doctrine, but rather would undermine the litigation funding
arrangement itself. Allowing discovery into the funding ar-
rangement-which, given the frequency of email communica-
tions between attorneys and the funder, may number well into
the thousands-would be immensely costly to an already cash-
strapped plaintiff. Indeed, even claiming privilege of these
documents may generate significant expense. 72 Insofar as liti-
gation funding arrangements are designed to more closely
level the economic playing field between parties, allowing de-
fendants to impose significant discovery costs upon the plain-
tiff that derive from the very arrangement intended to defray litigation
costs in the first place might well be seen as a tax levied only on
those plaintiffs who make use of litigation funding.
Similar value judgments were made somewhat more ex-
plicit in the decision in Miller UK. Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc. 73 In
71. See 6 DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 26.70[5] [b] (2015).
72. See infra Part II.B.
73. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
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Caterpillar, Judge Cole, a magistrate judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, denied Caterpillar's
motion to compel the production of various materials created,
shared, or discussed by plaintiff Miller, his counsel, or any
third party for the purpose of "considering, investigating, pur-
suing, arranging, or obtaining litigation funding. ' 74 Miller did
produce some of the documents requested voluntarily, but
withheld two categories of documents: first, documents show-
ing the structure and terms of its financing deal (the deal doc-
uments)-which Miller argued were not relevant, or in any
case, were privileged-and second, documents that had been
submitted to various third-party funders in the course of
Miller's seeking of litigation funding, which Miller argued
were privileged. 75
As to the deal documents, the court rejected Caterpillar's
suggestion that they were relevant, in a broad discovery sense,
to the case overall.7 6 Instead, the court found that the only
relevance the deal documents had was to Caterpillar's vaguely
pled defenses of champerty and maintenance, 77 but nonethe-
less rejected that claim of relevance on the grounds that,
under Illinois law, a third party must officiously intermeddle in an
action not belonging to that person for a statutory violation of
champerty and maintenance to occur. 78 In short, Judge Cole
effectively cut off Caterpillar's access to funding documents at
the pass; it never even reached the assertion of privilege. As to
the second set of documents, however, the court addressed di-
rectly the application of the work-product privilege to defend-
ants' request for documents submitted to potential third-party
74. Id. at 720.
75. Id. at 721.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 725 ("Caterpillar's claim that the 'deal documents' are relevant
rests on its largely unexplained assertion that the Miller's funding agree-
ment offends the Illinois statute prohibiting champerty and maintenance...
we are told unequivocally [by Caterpillar] that 'litigation funding agree-
ments are unlawful in Illinois and support a new Caterpillar defense.'").
78. Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/32-12). The judge reached the same conclu-
sion regarding Caterpillar's assertion that the deal documents were relevant
to an argument about who constituted the "real party in interest," finding
that third-party funders were in no way similar to a subrogee/insurance com-
pany or other arrangement whereby the third party takes control over the
case or its settlement, the analogy required under Illinois law for a defense
of "real party in interest." Id. at 728-30.
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funders. The documents, the court said, were no doubt rele-
vant, inasmuch as they likely included information about
Miller's claims. Nonetheless, the court held that the materials
were protected by the work-product doctrine (though not the
attorney-client privilege), even though the materials had been
shared with multiple potential funders, protected only by oral
confidentiality agreements. 79
Like Devon, Caterpillar reflects a fairly strong inclination
toward protecting funding documents from discovery. Moreo-
ver, the court in Caterpillar provided a much deeper discussion
of the relevant discovery principles of relevance and privilege.
That, combined with the weaker maintenance and champerty
law in Illinois,8 0 perhaps suggests that that discovery princi-
ples, and those principles alone, are doing the work in the
court's decision. Contained in the concluding paragraph of
the opinion, however, are statements by Judge Cole suggesting
that broader value judgments are at work. After a relatively
lengthy opinion devoted to discovery principles, Judge Cole
concludes his analysis by discussing alternative litigation fund-
ing more generally. After noting that there is a great deal of
debate about the normative value of third-party litigation fi-
nancing, he states that "questions of societal value are gener-
ally for the Legislature, and ajudge ought not 'succumb to the
temptation to substitute his own incandescent conscience for
the will of the legislature.' "81 Given an earlier statement in the
opinion that litigation funding represented a "new oppor-
tunit[y] for [creative businessmen] to profit" from economic
inequality, it appears that while Judge Cole is personally skepti-
cal of the value of litigation financing itself, he recognized that
the appropriate role of the judge prevented him from letting
79. Moreover, the court noted that the work-product privilege had not
been waived by sharing materials with third parties. For one, the work-prod-
uct privilege is only waived when the material shared is with an adversary or
in a manner that substantially increases the likelihood that the material will
be shared with an adversary. Id. at 736. Third-party funders are not adversa-
ries, the court noted, and moreover, the materials were shared pursuant to
oral agreements of confidentiality. Id.
80. See id. at 724 (making clear that Illinois law forbidding champerty
and maintenance is limited only to the funding of litigation that would not
have otherwise been brought-in other words-when the funder is an "offi-
cious" intermeddler whose services were not requested).
81. Id. at 742 (quoting HERSHEL SHANKS, THE ART AND CRAFT OFJUDGING:
THE DECISIONS OFJUDGE LEARNED HAND 13 (Macmillan, 1968)).
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such skepticism infect his decision-making, either about the
discoverability of litigation funding documents or about the
interpretation of Illinois champerty and maintenance statutes,
or both. Perhaps the inclusion of these statements stands for
nothing more than that.
However, particularly given that these thoughts about al-
ternative litigation finance immediately follow Judge Cole's
concluding characterization of the defendants' request-bur-
densome, costly, and seemingly aimed at obtaining insight
into plaintiffs' financial status-these statements indicate a
recognition that attempts to obtain funding materials should
not be fully conceptualized as mere discovery requests. Rather,
particularly in states that do not have strong maintenance and
champerty laws, the requests are more appropriately viewed as
attacks on both the funded plaintiff and upon litigation fund-
ing itself. Indeed, if allowing discovery of these materials
would constitute, as Judge Cole suggests, a substitution ofjudi-
cial judgment about the value of litigation financing for a leg-
islative one, then the requests themselves seem to represent an
attempt by non-funded parties opposed to litigation funding
to attack it indirectly, without the public input, scrutiny, and
difficulty that accompanies the legislative action Judge Cole
says is required.8 2
These same value judgments were made quite explicit in
the Court of Chancery of Delaware's opinion in Carlyle v.
Moonmouth Company.83 As in Devon and Caterpillar, defendants
in Carlyle requested production of materials relating to plain-
tiffs' arrangement with a third-party litigation funder. The
court granted plaintiffs' motion for protective order on the
grounds that the documents requested were protected by the
work-product privilege. The court's work-product analysis was
relatively straightforward, if arguably lenient in favor of pro-
tecting the materials. Specifically, the court stated that the
third-party litigation-funding documents were created "be-
82. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substan-
tive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015) (discussing the ways in which defendants
have used procedural mechanisms and contracts to reduce or eliminate the
ability of private parties to enforce various substantive laws, thereby avoiding
the more difficult task of effectuating change to the substantive law at the
legislative level).
83. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A., No. CV 7841-VCP,
2015 WL 778846 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2015).
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cause of' litigation, and that even though they also had a busi-
ness purpose, they were protected because they might, inter
alia, "reflect an analysis of the merits of the case." 84 The court,
however, did not stop there. After concluding that the materi-
als were protected by the work-product doctrine, it revealed
the normative underpinnings of the decision-normative un-
derpinnings not found within the confines of the work-prod-
uct doctrine: "Allowing work-product protection for docu-
ments and communications relating to third-party funding
places those parties that require outside funding on the same
footing as those who do not and maintains a level playing field
among adversaries in litigation. '85 In short, the Court of Chan-
cery made explicit what I believe was implicit in Devon and Cat-
erpillar, namely, that protecting from production litigation
funding materials is warranted notjust by the normative values
of the work-product doctrine, but also by the normative under-
pinning for alternative litigation financing. Moreover, to the
extent such protection is essential to the effectuation of that
normative goal, the converse holds: withholding protection of
litigation funding documents enables non-funded parties to at-
tack, by way of indirection, alternative litigation financing. 86
The most recent example of a judicial decision seemingly
motivated by value judgments about the desirability of protect-
ing litigation funding documents from discovery, and by ex-
tension, perhaps of protecting litigation funding itself, is the
class action case of Kaplan v. S.A.C. Capital.8 7 Kaplan involved
attempts by defendants to procure materials regarding the liti-
gation funding of named plaintiffs' counsel. The argument
made in Kaplan was that the adequacy of counsel's representa-
tion of the class depended in part on its financial resources to
prosecute the claim, and that the fact that counsel had ob-
84. Id. at *9.
85. Id.
86. At least two additional courts have recently held that litigation fund-
ing documents are protected by the work product doctrine. See, e.g., In re
International Oil Trading Co., 548 B.R. 825, 835 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016)
(concluding that tie documents concerning the negotiation of a litigation
funding agreement were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine); Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.L Dupont De Nemours
& Co., No. 07C-12-134-JRJ, 2015 WL 1540520 at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31,
2015) (same).
87. Kaplan v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, 1:12-cv-09350-VM-KNF, (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 2015) (Memorandum and Order).
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tained litigation funding was a red flag indicating those fi-
nances might be inadequate under Rule 23 (g). The magistrate
judge for the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, however, not only rejected the attempt at
discovery of the funding materials, it did so while never even
reaching the work-product question, which was fully briefed by
the plaintiff. Instead, the court held that the documents were
not even relevant to the adequacy issue. That decision was
then affirmed in full by the district judge.
That holding could well be questioned, at least on some
set of hypothetical facts. Indeed, one could imagine any num-
ber of legitimate concerns about the ways in which litigation
funding could alter the incentives of plaintiffs' counsel and
potentially create conflicts between its loyalty to the class.and
its contractual obligations to the litigation funder. The debata-
ble holding on relevance, then, can best be understood as re-
flecting a countervailing consideration, also present in the
work-product decisions, namely the desire to prevent disclo-
sure of litigation funding communications, and by extension
to prevent the use of discovery requests to impede the point of
the financing arrangement in the first place.
The prevailing tendency of courts toward protecting fund-
ing documents, across a number of factual circumstances, sug-
gests to me that broader normative battles about the function
and purpose of alternative litigation finance are at work. The
parties often recognize this; indeed, they may well be the gene-
sis. Within the motions and briefs by the parties filed in these
cases, one finds not just discussions about the extent to which
funding materials do or do not fit the traditional definition of
work-product, but also much broader debates regarding
whether alternative litigation finance arrangements themselves
are good or ill or even illegal.88
88. For instance, those requesting production of materials related to al-
ternative litigation finance frequently invoke crime/fraud arguments-spe-
cifically, that alternative litigation finance constitutes illegal champerty and
maintenance. See, e.g., Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL
4748160 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012); Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F.
Supp. 3d 711, 735 (N.D. 11. 2014). See also Charge Injection Techs, Inc. v.
E.I. DuPont De Numours & Co., C.A. No. 07C-12-134, 2015 WL 1540520
(Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2015), an ongoing case wherein defendant alleges
that plaintiffs' litigation funding arrangement constitutes an illegal arrange-
ment under maintenance and champerty law in Delaware.
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At some level, it is not unfair to say that these broader
normative considerations miss the point; that these considera-
tions do not fit comfortably within the contours of the work-
product doctrine and other discovery limitations. Whether al-
ternative litigation funding provides a needed recalibration of
resources among parties; whether alternative litigation finance
generates a normatively undesirable increase in litigation;
whether such arrangements constitute a morally objectionable
separation of claimant and claim-none of the answers to
these questions directly answer the core doctrinal or core nor-
mative questions that the work-product doctrine, or even the
discovery rules more broadly, seek to address.
On the other hand, this mismatch between the normative
underpinnings of alternative litigation finance and those un-
dergirding the work-product doctrine is the point. The work-
product doctrine at best protects funded parties from intru-
sion into the attorneys' "zone of privacy" in preparing the case
for litigation. The goal of protecting that limited aspect of the
adversarial process, however, does not address the broader
ways in which litigation funding affects the adversarial process,
or the ways in which these broad discovery requests into fund-
ing arrangements can undermine the goal of alternative litiga-
tion funding in leveling the playing field between litigants with
disparate resources.
Whatever one thinks as a normative matter about the
courts' response to the mismatch between the underpinnings
of the work-product doctrine and those of litigation funding,
as a descriptive matter, it seems rather clear that there is, in
fact, a mismatch. Indeed, as the next part begins to explore,
there are other problems that emerge for funded parties and
their litigation funding arrangements when such materials are
requested-concers the work-product doctrine is not ori-
ented toward. These problems further suggest that, as courts
seem to recognize, these discovery requests are not just discov-
ery requests. Instead, they are attacks, functionally, on litiga-
tion funding itself.
B. The Limits of the Work-Product Doctrine to Protect the Purpose
of Alternative Litigation Funding
Recognizing the protective policy toward litigation fund-
ing materials that seems to underlie these courts' decisions
sheds light on other, less frequently litigated issues that test
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the boundaries of the work-product doctrine as applied to al-
ternative litigation finance. Even in the context of a broad
trend toward protecting litigation funding materials from dis-
covery, the operation of the work-product doctrine-the invo-
cation of its protection, the litigation over the scope of that
protection-may itself frustrate the fundamental purpose and
operation of litigation funding. Given the limitations of the
essay format, I provide only a brief discussion of a single is-
sue-the ways in which the creation of a privilege log (stan-
dard practice when claiming work-product or other protection
for production) may frustrate the underlying goals of alterna-
tive litigation funding. As such, it is not just production of liti-
gation funding materials that tears at its foundation; the re-
quest itself constitutes a potential weapon by which requesting
parties can attack litigation funding.
To gain protection under the work-product doctrine, the
party from whom materials have been requested must assert
that privilege. The traditional way to assert the privilege entails
creating a privilege log for all documents the party asserts are
protected by the privilege. The creation of such a privilege log
is well known to be a burdensome task, and this burden may
be reliably pronounced in situations involving alternative liti-
gation financing: when a third-party financer engages in due
diligence into a potential investment-in this context, a law-
suit-there is naturally a great deal of communication be-
tween that third-party financer and the potentially funded
party, or, more often, the potentially funded party's attorneys.
Indeed, even before any funding arrangement is agreed upon,
the attorneys and third-party funders may exchange numerous
documents and emails, all in service of giving the third-party
funder adequate understanding of the litigation to feel com-
fortable funding it. Assuming the third-party financer agrees
to fund the litigation, additional communications occur. All
told, setting up and making use of litigation funding can result
in hundreds, if not thousands, of email communications and
other documents being exchanged between the funded party's
attorneys and the third-party financer. Requiring a party to
create a privilege log with all these communications would
thus be extraordinarily time-consuming and expensive.
At some level, the fact that the very existence of alterna-
tive litigation financing may well generate significant discovery
costs might be insufficient to think either that such arrange-
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ments call for special treatment under the discovery rules or
that the work-product doctrine is ill-fitting with third-party
funding. Indeed, to some degree-for better or worse-we ac-
cept the costs of refusing production on the basis of privilege
as part of an open and expansive system of discovery. Moreo-
ver, in the context of alternative litigation financing, to the
extent attorneys representing the funded party are working on
a contingency, the economic burden may well fall largely upon
them, rather than upon the third-party financer or the fi-
nanced party to the litigation.
On the other hand, perhaps the costs associated with
claiming privilege for materials created as part of a litigation
funding arrangement in particular ought to give us pause. For
starters, even if the funded party's attorneys bear the brunt of
the economic burden associated with asserting work-product
privilege for funding materials, that reality will naturally im-
pact the economics of the deal. If the attorneys know that they
will face a high burden of producing a privilege log with re-
spect to countless documents related to third-party funding,
that will not only affect their incentives to enter into the deal
in the first place, but it will likely also result in a demand by
those attorneys for a higher stake in the future proceeds as
reimbursement for the economic cost heaped upon them dur-
ing discovery. While such a demand may not be enough to
prevent the financing arrangement altogether, the one whose
hide is torn will likely be the funded party. Moreover, these are
costs that derive not from the plaintiffs' claims on the merits,
but from the manner in which that plaintiff sought to pay for
the high costs of litigation. In other words, these are costs that
arise merely from the fact that the plaintiff is impecunious-a
rather ironic result, given the fact that alternative litigation fi-
nancing, viewed in its most favorable light, exists to remedy
the inequality of resources that frequently prevents parties
from vindicating their substantive rights or leads the disadvan-
taged party to settle on the cheap.89 To put it more bluntly:
the cost of asserting the privilege itself constitutes a tax on par-
ties using third-party funding.
Viewed strategically, the economic burdens that accom-
pany the assertion of privilege for alternative litigation finance
89. See Glover, supra note 42 at 1748-49 (discussing how information im-
balances can disadvantage plaintiffs in the settlement process).
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are weapons ripe for the using by parties seeking to attack liti-
gation funding itself. To some degree, this is a literal truth:
Often, the extent to which funding materials might be "rele-
vant to a claim or defense" under Rule 26(b) (1) is largely tied
to more or less colorable defenses9" that the funding is illegal
because of doctrines of maintenance and champerty (though
defendants have and likely will assert relevance on other
grounds9 '). Because the plaintiff has received third-party fund-
ing, the door to discovery requests has been opened to a world
not accessible in non-funded litigation. Absent such funding,
an opposing party would not generally have a colorable claim
to materials relating to the plaintiff's general financial well-be-
ing, or to information regarding the financial resources it was
devoting to the litigation. Putting aside the strategic advan-
tages that would inure to a party able to obtain such informa-
tion, the discovery battles over that information inevitably af-
fect the resources the plaintiff could devote to continuing in
the litigation. That sort of impact is precisely what results from
discovery fights over litigation funding materials. More than a
result, that sort of impact may well be the gambit. In any given
suit, this impact may hinder or prevent the plaintiff from con-
tinuing on and vindicating her claims on the merits; it may
well undo the resource equality the financing arrangement
was intended to bring about. More broadly, if these sorts of
burdens can be reliably imposed in a number of cases, the will-
ingness of third-party funders to finance cases may well de-
crease, or, at the very least, their financial demands will in-
crease-in either instance, the perceived promise of a mecha-
nism for mitigating the inequality of resources in litigation will
be diminished.
The impact of privilege logs on litigation funding ar-
rangements, however, goes beyond the economic. The mere
creation of privilege logs regarding litigation funding materi-
als often may well reveal the very sort of information the work-
product privilege is designed to protect. A traditional privilege
90. Compare Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)
(champerty and maintenance "alive and well" in PA), with Miller, 17 F. Supp.
3d (noting that champerty and maintenance in Illinois requires that the
third-party financer be an officious intermeddler for otherwise waning doc-
trines of champerty and maintenance to apply).
91. See, e.g., Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 724, 729 (asserting that funding doc-
uments were relevant to an inquiry about the real party in interest).
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log includes the name of the party who sent the communica-
tion, the name of the party who received the communication,
anyone who was copied on the communication, the subject
matter of the communication, and the date of the communica-
tion. Where litigation funding is involved, however, that infor-
mation will in many cases give away a significant amount of
information about the funded party's strategy-the very sort of
information that is at the core of the work-product protec-
tion.92 For instance, say the privilege log in a given case indi-
cates that there was an email from the party's attorney to the
litigation funder with the subject line: "Funding Agreement-
Executed Copy." From that simple entry, the opposing party
knows the date on which the funding agreement was executed,
and that one date may provide insight into the funded party's
litigation strategy, for at the very least, that date tells the re-
questing party approximately when the party ran out of
money. Indeed, the fact that a litigant is financially in need of
third-party funding is itself valuable information to a well-
heeled adversary.
Despite this mismatch, there may well be solutions to this
problem in particular in the Federal Rules. Some courts have
permitted parties to use "categorical" privilege logs where the
burden of preparing a document-by-document privilege log
would be unreasonable, and/or where a documentspecific log
would itself divulge work-product that would undermine the
integrity of the adversarial process.9 3 Indeed, such an ap-
proach is suggested in the Advisory Committee notes to Rule
92. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (discussing that at-
torney's thoughts and mental impressions are at the core of the protection
for work-product).
93. See, e.g., In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 237 F.R.D. 69, 87 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (explaining that a categorical log is warranted where "(a) a document-
by-document listing would be unduly burdensome and (b) the additional
information to be gleaned from a more detailed log would be of no material
benefit to the discovering party in assessing whether the privilege claim is
well-grounded"); United States. v. Gericare Med. Supply Inc., 2000 WL
33156442, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2000) (permitting plaintiff to use a cate-
gory-by-category privilege log because a document bydocument privilege log
would have disclosed "information that itself would reveal the plaintiffs
strategy and mental processes").
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26 itself 9 4 and in the American Bar Association Civil Discovery
Standards.95 If courts in the future are confronted with the
issue, these approaches appear to be valuable tools for avoid-
ing the aforementioned concerns that the mere request for
funding documents can be used to undermine the purposes of
third-party funding.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, perhaps Congress will heed the
cries of the Chamber of Commerce and others and determine
that litigation funding, on balance, is a "bad" thing.96 Perhaps
state legislatures and courts-increasingly inclined to elimi-
nate or relax laws on maintenance and champerty97-will re-
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee's note to 1993 amendment
(suggesting the use of categorical logs "when voluminous documents are
claimed to be privileged or protected" and may be unduly burdensome).
95. CIVIL DiscovERY STANDARDS, No. 27 (Am. BAR. ASS'N 2004). In that
Standard, the ABA recommends the following alternative to the disclosure
of itemized information to support a claim of privilege:
If it would be overly burdensome, expensive and/or time-consum-
ing to prepare a detailed listing of the information called for in
Standard 26, the parties and the court should consider whether the
information can be supplied in some other way or, given the de-
mands and circumstances of the case, it can be reduced or elimi-
nated for some or all of the documents or communications in ques-
tion including whether: a. a categorical or general description of the ma-
terial in question would be sufficient, b. the existence of particular
privileged communication, as opposed to their content, is material
to the litigation; c. the likely probative value of the material in ques-
tion justifies the expense and burden of providing detailed infor-
mation; and d. the expense of providing detailed information
should be shared or paid by the party requesting that it be done.
Id.
96. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR L. REFORM, THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION
FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2009) (listing out the reasons litigation
financing is problematic and advocating for its prohibition).
97. Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir.
2011) ("The consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not ex-
panding, champerty's reach."); Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F.
Supp. 3d 711, 727 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("[M]aintenance and champerty have
been narrowed to a filament."); Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A.
Bauer, Litigation Finance Ethics: Paying Interest, J. OF THE PROF. LAw. 1, 6, 21
(2013) (writing for the ABA's Commission on Ethics 20/20's white paper of
February 2012 and stating that "shifts away from older legal doctrines such as
champerty, and society's embracing of credit as a financial tool have paved
the way for a litigation financing industry that appears poised to continue to
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verse course. Neither seem particularly likely, at least for now.
I suspect, then, that the ability of opposing parties to impose
the heavy economic burdens and to reap the strategic advan-
tages through discovery requests for funding materials will re-
main a tempting means of indirectly disabling or hindering
the ability of impecunious parties to pursue their claims.
Whether the current trend in favor of protecting funding doc-
uments is sufficient to remedy the mismatch between the
work-product doctrine and alternative litigation finance and
stave off the attacks remains to be seen.
grow"); Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997) (pointing
out that the champerty doctrine is no longer needed in Massachusetts); Os-
prey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000) (same in
South Carolina); Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901, 905 (R.I.
2002) (collecting cases finding that champerty is no longer needed in a
modern era).
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